Mullahs and Manteaus: Forms of Resistance in Modern Day Iran

Abstract

“My soldiers are still infants”[1], declared Ayatollah[2] Khomeini, envisioning masses of young Iranians to be trained as God’s soldiers. The spirit of optimism for youth is understandable- Iranian youths had just played an instrumental part in bringing down the Shah’s regime. Today’s Iranian youths- the infants Khomeini saw as his soldiers are, however, not ready to die and have ‘rejected their fathers' revolutionary ideals and strict religious rules’[3]. However, this does not mean that the youths of Iran have given up on resisting altogether. The resistance has in fact, taken more subtle forms and has been driven underground.

Based on Scott’s understanding of resistance, which necessitates the analysis of hidden transcripts, this paper analyses the passive forms of resistance in Iran using Scott’s typology of resistance, contrasted it against the official discourse of the mullahs and argues that the reforms initiated by Khatami and other reformers were necessary for that ‘parting of curtains’ that allows us a glimpse of that subculture of resistance in Iran. It concludes by acknowledging Scott’s contribution to our understanding of resistance while at the same time taking note of the areas where Scott’s observations need to be tailored in the context of Iran.

Introduction

Scott’s work has influenced the way scholars view resistance and the existence of ‘hidden transcripts’ has been acknowledged. However, there is still the implicit assumption that despotic governments manage to keep the latent dissatisfaction so under wraps that the outsider will be unable to see it.[4] It is still under this silent, operative assumption that one assumes, given the context of the autocratic regime in Iran that only certain accounts or forms of dissent and discontent are allowed to surface. Based on James Scott’s theory of the ‘hidden transcripts’- the idea that the analysis and observations of power relations are never complete without ‘mov(ing) beyond the domain in which poses and dissimulation prevail’[5],this paper aims to present the ‘hidden transcripts’ that are absent in the hegemonic discourse of the mullahs. This will be done through the analysis of  Brechtian[6] forms of resistance in Iran by transposing James Scott’s model in the ‘Weapons of the Weak’ on to contemporary Iran . The emphasis here will be on ‘informal resistance concerned with immediate, de facto gains’ (my emphasis), not ‘systematic, formal, overt resistance concerned with de jure change’.[7] Considering the plethora of accounts of ‘everyday forms of resistance’ in weblogs, ad-hoc news reports and personal memoirs[8] that have yet to form the basis of any serious study; this paper will be relevant in filling in the literature gap.

It has to be emphasized, however, that the employment of James Scott is limited to the use of his typology of resistance- the Brechtian forms of class struggle, and there will be no attempt to test any of Scott’s theories. Iran is not Sedaka; the objects of analysis here are not the peasants whose economic necessity forces them into false compliance but are instead the middle-class youths of Iran whose fear of state violence forces them to seek other avenues of resistance. Contrary to Scott’s Sedaka where the lines of hegemony are clear-cut and unambiguous, the Islamic Republic of Iran sees dissent coming from within its ranks of the ruling mullahs, creating a third class of those who want to keep to the theological state system but wish to see more reforms and personal freedoms as envisioned by the youths. Unlike Sedaka where the oppressor’s discourse is accepted- not due to any forms of false consciousness, but is in fact appropriated by the peasants who use it to ‘mitigate or deny claims made by (their oppressors) and to advance (their own claims)[9]’, we see that this inversion of the oppressor’s discourse does not characterize all forms of resistance in Iran. Also, unlike the rich landlords of Sedaka who need never know what the poor think of or say about them, the mullahs in Iran are well aware of their public image. In other words, the subculture in Iran is not so much a subculture because the mullahs are unaware of or not privy to it but rather because it takes the form of underground resistance that the mullahs and their agents try to gloss over in their hegemonic discourse. This subculture is not in concord with the image of the Islamic Republic that the Ayatollahs wish to present to the world. Until recently, with increased American interest in Iran, which has manifested itself in more Iranian-American accounts of their lives in Iran and more American journalists focusing their attentions on the Iranian people, the image of Iranians has been that of a strict Muslim, chador-wearing populace.[10]

These accounts which are divergent to the mullah’s conception of the perfect Islamic society have been made possible with the increased political reforms in the country. In a society where it is not uncommon to find citizens making jokes at the expense of the ruling mullah[11]  and youths have been known to greet passing clerics with a derisive ‘Hey, Marmoulak!’[12], and where Khatami’s goodbye speech at the University of Tehran saw the students present in the hall chanting “Daaneshjoo bidaari ast, as Khatami bizaar ast”[13] signals that the Khatami period had succeeded in introducing the broad based reforms that allows for that ‘parting of curtains’ and the momentary glimpse into the people’s discontent. If it is strong drink that overcomes a slave’s normal caution and allows the master a glimpse of the subculture in nineteenth century Virginia[14], it is the reforms and relaxation of rules that allow for that proverbial ‘parting of curtains’ and affords the ruling mullahs a glimpse of that subculture of resistance that has gone underground in Iran.

The background section below provides a brief political background of contemporary, post-revolutionary Iran between 1997[15] and today. It provides the background on the political scene in Iran, the conservative-reformist tug-of-war, the restrictions on cultural and political expressions and explains why the political climate in Iran had necessitated the underground nature of resistance in Iran.

‘Passive forms of Resistance’ utilises the typologies of resistance employed by James Scott to analyse and further understand the motivations and nature of the forms of passive resistance in Iran today. ‘Shared Vaues’ looks at the instances where the inversion of the patriarchal ideology to suit the needs of the oppressed as described by Scott has been appropriated in Iran and also the instances where these observations do not apply. ‘Mullahs as Gramsci’s intellectuals’ meanwhile explores the dissent present amongst the mullah ranks- a phenomenon that was absent in Sedaka but is an important and interesting ingredient in the resistance movement against the ruling mullahs in Iran. The element of dissent within the ranks in Iran is an important element to this study. Although formal and overt forms of dissent is by no means the focus of this paper, it will be seen in the background chapter how the dissenters within the mullah ranks, who, together with the secular intelligentsia form the broad category of ‘reformers’, have changed the political landscape in Iran. Cultural or religious inflections like taarof and taqiyya will be examined to provide an Iranian context to the concept of passive resistance discussed in this paper.

Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran regulates the outward forms of behaviour of its citizens- how men and women should relate in society, the appearance of women in public and various forms of media, men’s adoption of Western dress like neckties and short-sleeved shirts, forms of music allowed, even the playing of chess[16].

Two prominent student revolutions occurred in Iran in July 1999 and summer of 2003. Both the student revolutions resulted in a violent crackdown, with student leaders beaten in their dorms and incarcerated. The catalysts for the two student revolutions were the hardline crackdown on reformist newspapers and the death sentence pronounced on Hashem Aghajari, a university professor, for challenging the concept of the vilayat-e-faqih.[17]

Khatami’s election into office brought great hopes to the people of impending reforms. Amongst the reforms initiated by Khatami was the greater tolerance of critique against the government in the press, the choice of Ataollah Mohajerani for Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who initiated a dialogue with the US and loosened the censorship codes on filmmaking and the media[18]. Yet, every indication of reform from the reformist camp is met by a countermove from the hardliners culminating in the barring of thousands of reformist candidates from running for office in the 2004 elections in what seems like a political checkmate.[19]

With the hardliners regaining the upper hand in the government ultimately, routine arrests and forced confessions have been used as methods of intimidating students and youths who were suspected of being involved in political activities.

As the report commissioned by the Human Rights Watch detailing the torture and repression faced by overt dissenters in Iran[20] suggests, overt resistance to the ruling mullahs in Iran is an unappealing option.[21] The authorities target the leadership of the student dissent movement, the leading reformist writers and newspaper editors, the high-profile arrests of these people and their consequent denunciations have “chill(ed) expression among the general public”[22] and sends the message across clearly to “those considering engaging in political expression: ‘it is not worth it’”.[23]

“These days the youths are not ready to pay. They prefer to depoliticize and the conservatives are very happy about that. They are looking for passive masses,”[24] says Hamid Reza Jalaipour a ’46 year old sociologist and one-time student activist who now runs reformist newspapers.’[25]

Yet this paper argues that there is a certain degree of politicization in the very political apathy that Iranian youths today profess. In signaling their distance from the mullahs who they resent and the secular intellectuals ‘they do not understand’[26], these youths are spouting a new mantra: ‘bemantcheh’, or Farsi for ‘I couldn’t care less’; a phrase so political in its professions of apoliticization. By signifying their detachment from the political scene in Iran, these youths are consciously detracting from the legitimacy of those in power. The same Iranian youths that afforded Khatami his political landslide in 1997 and again in 2000 are now evincing a political apathy so pronounced and insistent in its nonchalance that it could have only been the product of disillusionment in the political system[27].

In the face of such systematic repression in the Islamic Republic of Iran, much of the resistance amongst the youths of Iran has gone underground, facilitating  the utilization of Scott’s theories of ‘the hidden transcripts’. The youths of Iran,[28] who never saw the revolution’s excesses, but are intimidated enough by life’s experiences to know not to cross the paths of the mullahs, are increasingly finding ways to circumvent the regime’s rules and religious police to achieve what they want.  These dogged, persevering acts of transgression, which James Scott has marveled as ‘a testament to human persistence and inventiveness’[29] boils down to the reluctance of this generation to enter yet another bloody revolution. When asked :” ‘So what would happen if you all took them off, all at once?’ The answer was Iranian, and abrupt. ‘Another revolution, a bloodbath, and nobody is prepared to pay that kind of price’ “. [30]

Passive forms of Resistance.

Given the repressive political climate in contemporary Iran, resistance to the government has taken on a more subversive nature- turning ordinary acts into political statements of resistance in Scott’s vein; everyday acts of resistance predicated on selfish needs and immediate gains. The forms of resistance that will be discussed in this paper are as follows:

1.                        Tighter shorter manteaus and more colourful, flimsy scarves.

2.                        Underground parties.

3.                        Blogging

4.                        Satellite TV and a demonstrated fascination with America.

5.                        Keeping of dogs.

6.                        Mullah Jokes

This section analyses how James Scott’s conception of passive resistance in ‘Weapons of the Weak’ will help us better classify and understand the motivations and forms of passive resistance going on in Iran.

.

Mullahs and manteaus

This paper argues that the creative licence employed by the women in their everyday dress codes is synonymous to the ‘footdragging’ category. By footdragging, Scott talks about a kind of ‘pushing and shoving’ form of resistance that is best exemplified by the use of his analogy of the buffalo who resists his owner enough to ensure a tolerable pace of work[31]. It signifies an unwillingness to comply, but, coerced and beaten into submission, tries to make the situation marginally tolerable by dictating the pace of work and causing an amount of inconvenience to the master/oppressor without causing any great deal of injury to the resister. Unhappy with the enforced dress codes, the women try to make it more tolerable by introducing colour into their manteaus. To make it more fashionable while simulating adherence outwardly, the women push the envelope by having their scarves made of flimsy, gauze-like material in bright colours[32]. Shorter, tighter manteaus also allow for an amount of false compliance- allowing the women to flaunt their sexuality that the dress code was meant to keep under wraps.

The political significance of the women who don these ‘subversive manteaus’ can be a conscious decision to resist. Arash, a stereotypically fey fashion designer in Azadeh Moaveni’s memoirs of living in Iran, explains how : “ ‘By nature, I am a pacifist’, but in Iran, he (regards himself as ) a foot soldier in the struggle against the regime’s assault on beauty. He wanted to reclaim the roopoosh[33], make it exquisite and flattering, turn the Islamic uniform into a garment of aesthetic resistance”.[34]

The increasingly relaxed dress codes of the women on the streets of Tehran can be said to be indicative of the extent to which the transcripts are ‘hidden’[35]. Scott in ‘Weapons of the Weak’ proposes that the extent to which the transcripts are hidden is dependent on the political climate- ranging from Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’[36] to ‘the most extreme situations of Caligulan terror… where the entire transcript may be concealed, leaving only paralysis’.[37] Azadeh Moaveni remarked in her book, ‘Lipstick Jihad’, that women used to carry socks in their purses in the event that they have a run-in with conservative forces on the streets. As the reform movement gained momentum, these women dispensed with the socks altogether. Khatami’s ascension into office saw an informal[38] relaxation of the dress code for women. The political climate was relaxed as Khatami urged for more personal freedoms. This paper suggests therefore, that the laxity in dress codes of the women in Tehran be seen as a political barometer of the success, or failure of the reform movement in Iran.

This is not the first time that the women of Iran are using dress as a form of resistance against the ruling party. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, secular Iranian women were taking to the streets in chadors[39] and head scarves as a sign of solidarity with their working class sisters and as a sign of protest against the corrupt, Westernised Shah.

Underground parties in Tehran

The legendary underground parties that constitute the après-ski activities in Dizin and Shemshak as well as in private homes in Tehran are a combination of the Brechtian elements analysed in Scott’s work. Whilst the act of partying itself is subversive and sneaky, a la the peasant who steals from his rich employer, it also contains elements of dissimulation in the event of party organizers arranging for their parties to coincide with religious events in order to provide an excuse for attendees caught going home late at night. Through the act of bribing officials to stay away from their compounds and not harass the attendees, there is also a certain degree of dissimulation present. The bribes dispensed simultaneously acknowledges the power of authority (to disrupt) whilst making a mockery of the whole religious façade. Thus, in its rejection of the Islamic values and codes of behaviour imposed by the mullahs, the youths involved in the underground parties are committing an act similar to the peasants of Sedaka boycotting an offending individual’s kenduri[40] and then themselves hosting an ill-afforded kenduri. By boycotting the individual’s kenduri, and then hosting one of their own, the poor are implicitly rejecting the social mores of the boycotted individual and are then constructing an alternative avenue and display of their social norms through the hosting of their own kenduri. The young, by hosting their own alcohol-fuelled underground parties are constructing that different social norm and figuratively turning their backs on the social values of the mullahs.

In contrast to Scott’s kenduri politics where the poor gripe at not being invited or comment on the increasingly frugal nature of the once-legendary kenduris- an exercise where the oppressed are trying to be included and recognized within the social construct- the underground parties aim at excluding the mullahs and officers of the state rather than try to be included within the social construct. While the poor villagers of Sedaka need social recognition through being invited for kenduris, the youths of Iran are political in their attempt to construct a world that excludes the mullahs, based on a cohesive, underground social network. Azadeh Moaveni, in her account of a ‘mixed’ birthday party in Tehran recounts how it was no ordinary birthday party but rather a ‘pushing and shoving match with the Islamic Republic- a cultural rebellion waged indoors  against the regime’s rigid codes of behavior’.[41]

An individual’s involvement in underground parties in Tehran can thus be construed to be similar to the pilfering and stealing under Scott’s typologies, in that it simultaneously fulfils a need, in this case, the Iranian youth’s need for an avenue to vent their pent-up youthful energy while at the same time offering it up as another symbolic form of resistance against the establishment. This of course brings to mind Scott’s dilemma in classifying the acts of the thief who sheafs the paddy and allows enough left to be gleaned by his family- is the thief simply a thief, tout court, or a resister as well and is the youth, in his/her partying ways a hedonistic youth tout court, or a resister as well?[42] Acts that fall under this category are normally subjected to that kind of ambiguity that Scott brought up.

Depending on the consciousness of motivations behind the act of being involved in a party, the party-going youth can fit under Scott’s categories of ‘pilfering’ or ‘kenduri politics’.

http://stop.censoring.us[43]

The blogging phenomenon would be the closest parallel to one of Scott’s typologies. Similar in motivation to libel and slander and constituting the modern avatars of the poison pen letters in Sedaka, bloggers in Iran realize the worldwide audience afforded them through the medium of the internet. The nature of the internet allows them to level their criticism against the government behind an anonymous façade, making therefore, a close parallel to the surat layang[44] circulating in Sedaka. The anonymous criticism against the government, meant to puncture the pristine façade that the state-controlled media has sought to perpetuate through the exposing of drug addiction problems in Iran, human rights abuses, poverty and prostitution. These criticisms also aim to chip at the prestige and social standing of the mullahs, much in the same spirit as the libel, slander and gossip of the poor villagers against their richer counterparts.  We see how the internet, in particular the anonymity that blogging affords, have become a significant ‘weapon of the weak’.

Blogging is a veritable tool in the hands of the oppressed youths of Iran. Through their weblogs, these bloggers realize that they are able to reach a worldwide audience. Several of the Iranian-based blogs point out the inconsistencies between the façade that the Islamic Republic tries to maintain and the realities. Accounts of the poor, the drug addicts and stories of prostitution can be found on various weblogs run by Iranians.[45]

To further push across the message of resistance and the autonomous nature of the internet; Iranian bloggers, in the aftermath of the conservative crackdown on reformist newspapers have taken to renaming their sites after the reformist papers that have been closed down in symbolic protest against the mullahs’ attempts at censorship[46].

Blogging, along with a greater freedom of expression, saw a renaissance during the ‘Iranian Spring[47]’. Keen on fulfilling his campaign platform, Khatami worked towards a greater freedom of expression, censoring only ‘pornographic and immoral sites’ and tolerating those that criticized the government.[48] Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a political ally of Khatami and ex-vice president, is himself a prominent blogger[49].

Obsession with the Great Satan

The first Middle Eastern country to hold a candlelight vigil for the Americans in the wake of 9-11, the citizens of Iran today no longer have the same hatred for America that their predecessors did. The obsession with everything American can be understood again under the need to construct an alternative reality or value system. By holding up American culture and supposed lifestyle as an ideal, the youths of Iran are constructing an alternative to the value system imposed upon them by the mullahs. This is somewhat similar to the peasants in Sedaka who, scandalized by the penny-pinching ways of the rich landowners in their conduct of kenduri, have decided to boycott these kenduris altogether and host an ill-afforded one of their own, thus constructing an alternative  based on the value system that they hold up.

A further example of the Iranians working to construct alternatives to the value system afforded by the mullahs is the proliferation of satellite antennas peeking from the top of the roofs in Tehran. ‘Determined not be marooned at home with bad Islamic TV’[50], Iranians have been systematically installing banned satellite TV in their homes.

Iranian youth’s obsession with everything global and preferably American- from the craze with American pop music, to Barbie dolls and the burger chain fads[51]- can be seen, not only as an effect of globalization, but a lifestyle choice to rile the mullahs. By holding up what is perceived to be profane, ‘westernized’ and therefore un-Islamic to the mullahs, as an ideal, the youths of Tehran are consciously voting against the sensibilities of the ruling mullahs: ‘young people embraced the ‘Great Satan’s’ products not out of approval for US foreign policy in the region but rather as a way to register their discontent with the religious conservatives who controlled their country’.[52]

The obsession with the MTV lifestyle borders on the point of being ridiculous, which, in their minds, involved ‘romp(ing) around in bikinis, listening to Puff Daddy, sitting on each other’s laps, and pretending they are at the MTV summer beach house’[53], showing up at ay social opportunity which allows some freedom behind closed doors, in lebass-e mahvarayee, or satellite dress, named after the illegal satellite channels screening Persian music videos from Los Angeles.

Succumbing to the lures of globalization can take on a very political nature in Iran. As Nicholas Kristof noted in his article ‘Those Friendly Iranians’, ‘being pro-American is a way to take a swipe at the Iranian regime; anything American, from blue jeans to Baywatch is revered’.[54] A note has to be made here however to keep the distinctions between being pro-American and being pro-American policy. It is too easy to be caught up in a spirit of optimism and conflate the two together- as Nicholas Kristof’s reports on Iran shows[55]. Iranian youths, who are no longer rabidly anti-American as the previous generation[56], are still conscious of and aware of their Persian heritage and still bring up CIA’s involvement in the Mossadegh overthrow as an expression of their disagreement with America’s conduct of its foreign policies. Kristof’s coverage of Iran for the New York Times has been criticized as ‘arrogant’ and as having ‘indulged in the taarof of the Iranians[57]’.

  The mullah’s lapdogs

In another act of resistance, Iranians have taken greater relish in acts that are deemed to be un-Islamic. More and more Iranians are keeping dogs as pets[58], leading an ayatollah in the province of Orumiyeh to remark, in a sermon, “Happy are those who become martyrs and did not witness the playing with dogs! Now, in our society, women wear hats and men hold dogs”.[59]

The category of ‘keeping of dogs’ is emblematic and covers the range of activities frowned upon as being contrary to Islam by the mullahs. Other activities that fall under this category would be the illegitimate sexual activities that have gone underground and the celebration of Norouz[60] and Yalda[61], both festivals dating back to Zoroastrian times and are frowned upon by the mullahs due to their associations with a pre-Islamic era.

The keeping of dogs in the Islamic Republic of Iran could mean two things- the turning of the dog owner’s back to the values and ideals of the Islamic Republic and/or dissimulation. Despite the religious ruling against the keeping of dogs as pets, there is a possibility to exploit a theological loophole which allows for the keeping of dogs as guard dogs- Neil Mc Farquhar, in his article ‘Dogs are not an Ayatollah’s best friend’[62], insists on the possibility of registering one’s poodle as a guard dog. These existing theological loopholes afford an avenue for dissimulation- a mock exercise of adhering with the mullah’s conceptions of what is proper and moral.

The strict segregation of genders in Iran, accompanied by the harassment from ad-hoc basiji checkpoints for couples who are not mahram[63] have driven sex underground. Similar to the theological loopholes present for those who wish to keep dogs, there are couples who exploit the existing theological loopholes through the practice of sigheh.[64] Through the practice of sigheh[65], the couple receives the blessings of the ruling mullahs[66]. Whilst sigheh has been sanctioned by the state, society still views it as a taboo; consequently the use and practice of sigheh is usually accompanied by a cynical motivation of exploiting the existing theological loophole rather than a genuine belief in the religiously-sanctioned nature of the act. This is again similar to Scott’s theory that peasants are capable of facilitating the discourse provided to them by their oppressors to advance their own cause.

Those who engage in illicit, illegitimate sex, however, without the guise of the sigheh, can be argued to be another instance where the youths of Iran have consciously rejected the value system of the mullahs. This is because, through engaging in illegitimate sex[67], especially given that sigheh is so accessible, the youths are turning their backs to the value system of the mullahs and constructing an alternative of their own.

The different ways through which it has become possible to legitimize an act within an framework authorized by the Islamic Republic has become something of a joke. The fluidity of fatwas with the different choice of marja-e-taqlids[68] has been caricatured in Lipstick Jihad when Azadeh Moaveni made an online search for a ‘nicotine-friendly’ mullah whom she vaguely remembered having allowed smoking in the month of Ramadan.

Mullah jokes

Sedaka had its Haji Brooms, Kadir Cetis and  Haji Sangkuts[69] along with Haji Merduk and Haji Karut[70]- larger than life caricaturizations meant to poke fun at the rich landowners[71] in Sedaka who try to evoke a picture of piety. These caricatures besides providing for entertainment amongst the poor in the village serve a dual purpose of creating a value system. Statements like “The sins of a Haji are worse than those of ordinary Muslims, because he knows it’s wrong but he does it anyway. A false Haji is the very worst”[72], force the Hajis in the village to fulfil higher societal expectations as per their behaviour. Hajis in Sedaka, like the mullahs of Iran, are expected, due to their religious credentials, to behave in a more religiously orthodox way than anyone else. The outliers like the Haji Brooms and Kadir Cetis  not only fail to meet societal expectations of a higher standard of behaviour but in fact behave contrary to Islamic codes of conduct, practising usury[73] and behaving ruthlessly for financial gains. In Iran on the other hand, the mullahs caricatured are those who are lascivious, greedy, lazy and hypocritical.

Jokes made at the expense of mullahs are easily categorized under ‘libel and slander’ of James Scott’s typology of resistance. Transmitted largely via oral means, and meant to chip away at the prestige of the mullahs in Iran and rich landowners in Sedaka by pointing out the incongruities between the pristine pictures these rich landowners and mullahs paint of themselves and the ‘reality’.

The Iranian traditional arts scene is peppered with jokes about the mullahs. Hafez, regarded as one of Iran’s best classical poets, often turned to the description of the joys of drinking wine in his poetry, often in direct association with another line mocking the orthodox clergy. In one line in the Divan, Hafez wrote: ‘"Hafez drink wine! Practice profligacy and be happy; but, like others, make not the Koran the snare of deceit"[74], alleging the orthodox clergy of using the Koran as a snare of deceit in their Tartuffian[75] insistence on orthodoxy.

In a country where the film that generated the most excitement amongst the populace happens to be one that satirizes the cleric, it is not surprising that an entire cottage industry has sprouted to caricaturize the mullahs in Iran.

Marmoulak[76], a film that elbowed foreign films off the blockbuster list in Iran and opened without any official publicity, caricaturizes the Iranian mullahs. In it, a convicted thief robs a dying mullah of his robes, escapes out of prison, ogles and sweet-talks an attractive young woman asking for his blessings, robs a house in his clerical robes and saying that not all clerics deserve respect. In scenarios that mimic real-life, the thief, once dressed in clerical robes and attempting to escape realizes the disadvantages of donning the clerical robes as taxi drivers refuse to stop for him.[77]

A theatrical precedent of Marmoulak comes in the form of Bijan Mofid’s ‘Shahr-e-qesseh[78]’,   or ‘City of Tales’ ,which were ‘broadcast by fans from the rooftops of Tehran when the revolution turned sour’[79]. Gholam Hossein Saedi’[80]s play ‘Othello in Wonderland[81]’, written post-1979 Islamic Revolution deals with the problems of censorship in Iran and the ideological tussle between the mullahs and the secular intelligentsia and contains comical scenes where the mullahs are caricatured as well.

The jokes are not new- Iranians have been known to poke fun at the clerics even in their presence[82]. Bemoaning the skewed new economy and the rise of the ‘millionaire mullahs’, a class of nouveau riche who drive BMWs, occupy houses in prestigious neighbourhoods and who generally prosper under the current system, many are complaining, that, while ‘In the Shah's time, people are fond of saying, the people at the top would eat their bread, and we used to get the crumbs. But nowadays people complain that some mullahs lick their plates so clean that there's not a single thing left over for the rest of us’.[83]

Accounts of how youthful attendees of a party in a private residence in Tehran, dressed up as mullahs and ayatollahs, “whirl(ed) drunkenly through the crowd” and “a girl in a black chador, flung it off to reveal a Catwoman suit underneath”[84] shows how having fun can be subversive in Iran.

Mullahs have also been criticized on the way they have used their religious authority to sanction and legalize prostitution, through their lucrative sigheh[85] sideline. Through emphasizing the mullah’s involvements in the legalization of prostitution, no matter how inadvertent or unintended the effects were, ordinary Iranians are able to cast doubt upon the pristine edifice of religiosity that the mullahs try to maintain.

James Scott drew an analogy comparing the wealth of vocabulary in the Eskimo language ‘to describe varieties of snow that pass unnoticed in other cultures’ to the ‘sumptuous linguistic feast of terms to describe every possible degree and variety of tightfistedness’[86], suggesting in the next sentence that the terms most in vogue were Haji Bakhil and Haji Kedekut- both terms connoting stinginess and tightfistedness. We would say that in Iran, there is a similar wealth in its culture and tradition that ridicules the mullah’s shortcomings.

Taarof and taqiyya

The Iranians have a word for dissimulation. Taarof, which is a cultural trait and a sign of good manners for Iranians, is a flowery way of saying things that one does not really mean in order to give the ‘impression of glowing social relations’[87].

Javad Larijani, a ‘conservative member of parliament’[88] explained taarof as such to Elaine Sciolino: “There’s a hidden reality, a hypocrisy that keeps the peace. It protects the dignity of the other. Architects don't build glass houses in Iran. If you don't speak of everything so openly, it's better. Being able to keep a secret even if you have to mislead is considered a sign of maturity. It's Persian wisdom. We don't have to be ideal people. Everybody lies. Let's be good liars."[89]

Roozbeh Shirazi[90] offers a historical angle to the concept of taarof: ‘… Iranians learned the art of cultural seduction when their military prowess faded, and spoke with honeyed tongues to achieve their ends. In taarof, Iranians often make polite, but empty, offers and statements to appease their guests in order not to offend them.’ Although now more commonly used in the context of social relations, taarof has historically been used as a way to dissimulate to the ruling powers.

Taqiyya, on the other hand, is the religious equivalent of dissimulation. Taqiyya is a ‘religious dispensation by which Muslims under compulsion or threat of injury were relieved of their religious requirements, including the observance of Ramadan, daily prayers and dietary restrictions’[91] and was historically used to dissimulate their religious convictions in the atmosphere of forced conversions in sixteenth-century Spain. Modern day Iran however sees a curious inversion of this phenomenon. Forced to adopt a set of religious values that the general citizens might not share, Iranians might be increasingly turning away from Islam inwardly, whilst continuing to dissimulate their Muslim faith on the surface[92].

Shared Values?

In ‘Weapons of the Weak’, Scott illustrates the social dynamic of Sedaka as being one based on shared social values of ‘tolong[93]’, ‘bantu’ and ‘sedekah’. A wealthy villager who violates these norms can be shamed through the labels of ‘Haji Broom’ or ‘kedekut’. A wealthy villager seeking to defend himself from the accusations or absolve himself from these moral responsibilities would have to argue how the poor, who are to be looked after, are not actually poor, but rather feigning it. The wealthy villagers point out traits like laziness and shortsightedness on the part of the poorer villagers. Haji Salim points out the example of a poor villager who received zakat but instead of providing for his family, bought a pair of M$35 shoes; sniffing: “He wears fancier (shoes) than the well-off”.[94]

In part, this discourse of the moral obligation to help the less well-off was created by the wealthy before the age of combine harvesting to serve the purposes of the wealthy. By portraying themselves as noble, caring members of the village who carried out their social and religious obligations through zakat and sedekah, the wealthy are afforded other avenues to lure the labour force necessary to thresh their paddy fields. It is only fitting then, that the ‘rich should now be hoisted on their own petard and accused of callous disregard, if not contempt, for those whom they once claimed to assist.’[95]

There might not be a similar set of shared values between young Iranians and the mullahs. As the majority of the population in Iran is under-35, this means that most of the population of Iran today were either born after the revolution or were too young to have actively or consciously participated in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The theocratic government, therefore, is not one of their own choosing but is instead thrust upon them. The only conscious political choice that the young people made that could be argued as having legitimised the Iranian government today was when they turned up in masses in 1997 and again in 2002 to vote the reformist Khatami into office. It can be argued then, that there will be little shared values, if any, between the youths of Iran and the ruling mullahs. The sophisticated form of inverting the oppressor’s discourse on its head; ‘criticizing the contradictions present within the hegemonic idealization in its own terms’[96] (Scott’s emphasis) is therefore less nuanced in Iran than Sedaka, simply because the youths focus on rejecting the values imposed upon them by the mullahs rather than appropriating that discourse to serve their needs.

Unlike Scott’s Sedaka where the peasants ingeniously appropriated the discourse of the rich landowners previously used to further the latter’s interests for their own use, thus overturning the rich landowner’s discourse on their heads, we see little similarity in Iran. Iranian youths resist the mullahs through a conscious rejection of their discourse. Youths covet the American lifestyle in direct opposition of the mullahs’ attempts to paint America as ‘The Great Satan’. Bourgeois activities like skiing and partying have fallen back in favour with this generation after the general revolutionary fervour of the earlier generation. Essentially, what is rejected by the mullahs is celebrated by the young in Iran.

 Probably the only similarity between the inversion of discourse amongst Sedaka’s peasants and the youths of Iran would pertain to the religious credibility of the mullahs as well as the more theologically sophisticated arguments of secular intellectuals like Shariati and Soroush who have challenged the vilayat-e-faqih concept. In the same way that the peasants of Sedaka poke fun at the Hajis who try to pass off their garb and the fact that they have been on a pilgrimage as symbols of religious credibility, the youths of Iran have similarly poked fun at the mullahs through movies like Marmoulak and everyday jokes. In a similar spirit, the youths in Iran are also facilitating religious events as excuses to be out late at night- as guises for their less-than-Islamic alcohol-fuelled mixed parties or the cynical use of the last (mournful) night of Ashoura[97] as a pick-up scene.

The youths of Iran do effect a Scott-like inversion of hegemonic discourse in some ways, but these ways are limited and the forms of their resistance focuses more greatly on rejecting the values of the mullahs altogether. This is seen in how the youths, as part of their symbolic resistance to the mullahs, celebrate anything that the mullahs deem vile- keeping dogs as pets, anything vaguely un-American and celebrating the pre-Islamic Persian past, a history that the mullahs try to deny, de-emphasize or keep under wraps.

Here, we see that while the currency of exchange between the rich and the poor villagers in Sedaka is an Islam-tinged notion of social responsibility; in Iran the currency is Islam; where the youths try to score points against the mullahs by either denying them the religious legitimacy, denying Islam, or cynically using Islam to achieve what they want within the framework.

  Manufacturing consent

Noam Chomsky in his book, ‘Manufacturing Consent’[98], illustrated, through a number of case studies, how the media, instead of being the agents and progenitors of truth, actually serve as tools to prop up the system of domination through its selective and partial coverage of events.

The ruling mullahs in Iran can similarly be seen to be orchestrating a reality by promoting and propagating a certain version of ‘truth’ to explain events and phenomena they are unable to delete from the people’s minds.

The aforementioned poet, Hafez and, to a lesser extent Khayyam, both of whom had an uneasy relationship with the orthodox clergy during their lifetimes, are widely regarded as Iran’s premier classical poets. Both have alluded to the joys of wine drinking through their poetry; an image which is incompatible with the religious tenor of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to their long tradition of having been passed through generations simply by oral history alone, and thus not similarly subject to the mullah’s censorship rulings as are films and contemporary literature, the ruling mullahs have had to come up with creative ways of handling the intransigence of these poets from antiquity. Having interviewed a few Iranians, Paul Cochrane came to the conclusion that the mullahs have advanced a theory that the wine described in the poetry of sufi poets is not actually wine, but rather an allegory to the joys of communicating with God, of the ecstasy of divine presence with the tavern referring to a Sufi monastery.

Hafez, an individual whose relationship with the orthodox clergy was characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust in life and in death, it is an ironic twist to the tale that Hafez’s works were employed in the propaganda efforts heralding the return of Khomeini from his exile in France. Next to the rest of the revolutionary slogans on the streets of Tehran, appeared a curious poetic insertion: ‘Div cho birun ravad fereshteh dar ayad.” (When the demon departs, the angel shall arrive).[99]

The above examples illustrate how the mullahs try to incorporate elements of popular culture within their framework when they realize that they are unable to beat them. The classical Sufi poets are but one example.

Creation of ‘the Other’

In Iran today we similarly see a discourse that has been created by the ruling mullahs to serve their needs. This discourse usually revolves around their role as protectors and preservers of the theocratic nature of the state as well as the sanctity of Islam. This daily discourse has necessitated the creation of ‘the Other’, the ‘Other’ in this case usually being America[100] as representative of the corrupt West. The mullahs’ discourse revolved around the exclusion of foreign influences; the simultaneous construction of self-identity and countering Western civilization- gharbzadeghi(Westoxication), terms introduced  and popularized into the mainstream by Jalal al-e Ahmad, Daryush Shayegan and Reza Davari-Ardakani[101], a curious formation of the ‘Occidental other’ in an inversion of Said’s Orientalism[102] discourse.

The recantations, forced confessions and allegations made against ‘the enemies of the state’ in Khomeini’s time revolved around the irreligious nature of the individuals or organizations, its affiliations with America and/or the Shah. The mullahs started to include a denunciation of bourgeois activities in the consolidation stage of the Islamic Revolution[103]. Skiing as an activity was banned for a while due to its associations to the bourgeois lifestyles of the aristocracy.[104] Opponents or resisters were usually accused of being either one or sometimes a combination of three things- un-Islamic, a lackey of America or a bourgeois supporter of the Shah. Through the analysis of the passive forms of resistance in Iran, this paper argues that the modes of passive resistance amongst the young in Iran revolve around a rejection of the discourse of the mullahs.

Similarly, prior to the election of Khatami, the Iranian regime has actively sought to perpetuate its idea of the ideal Islamic society, proclaiming, for instance, that drug abuse has disappeared with the fall of the Shah; something entirely in discord with official UN figures that cites a 2.8% heroin and opium addiction figure as compared to 2.1% in Laos and 1.7% in Pakistan.[105]

According to official figures there are 1.2m addicts and 800,000 occasional users out of a population of 73m. But an Iranian journalist who specialises in the subject disagrees, saying that figures are much higher in reality. When drug dealers and addicts were arrested in Haft-e-tir Park, government-controlled television declared these to be ‘sexual perverts who were bothering women’ simply to cover up the problem of drug addiction in Iran.[106] We see how facts and statistics have been distorted in the hegemonic attempts of the mullahs in their carefully manufactured and controlled image of the Islamic Republic.

The veiled panopticon[107]

Typical of an autocratic and repressive regime, the mullahs have created an atmosphere that has convinced the citizenry that they are being watched all the time, so much so that, “accustomed to being watched in public, people internalized the minding gaze of the regime, and turned it back outward’.[108] Recalling an incident involving an eccentric aunt(Khaleh Farzi), who refuses to put on her headscarf in public; slinging it instead, across her shoulders, Moaveni recounts how people she did not deem as being particularly religious, ‘shot (her) disapproving glances… and that (she) was the one at fault for not telling (her aunt of her moral transgression of appearing bare-headed in public)’.[109]

Based on a Koranic injunction of ‘Amr bemarouf, va nahi be monker’ which translates into ‘promoting virtue and containing vice’, the mullahs in Iran have given power to ordinary citizens to deal with what they deem as un-Islamic acts committed by fellow Iranians. This has manifested itself in the Basiji- a ‘voluntary’ group of young, disenfranchised Iranian teenagers who set up ad-hoc checkpoints to make sure that Islamic codes of conduct are adhered to and frequently resort to violence against the perpetrator of an act considered by them as un-Islamic.

Mullahs as Gramsci’s organic intellectuals[110]?

It is important to sustain a dominant ideology in efforts to maintain hegemony, as seen in Chomsky’s ‘Manufacturing Consent’. Contrasting the ‘traditional intellectuals’ who seek to perpetuate the current hegemony versus the ‘organic intellectuals’ who seek to overthrow the prevailing hegemony, the dissent within the ranks of mullahs in Iran serves to blur the traditional/organic intellectuals dichotomy of Gramsci. Expected to be instrumental in perpetuating the hegemony simply due to the social base they spring from, these mullahs instead shock in their criticism of the state’s theological construct.[111]Theologically trained and more ideologically inclined, these dissenting Ayatollahs fuse elements of Soroush[112] with the main strains of theology.

In recognition of the importance of these Ayatollahs who were opposed to the current theocracy, Goft-o-gu, a journal launched in 1992, had, as one of its aims to open channels of constructive dialogue between Iran’s disparate political and intellectual currents by initiating the dialogue with the previously ignored and largely disdained Muslim intellectuals.

In the remarkable ideological schism that surfaced almost immediately after the Islamic Revolution, the Grand Ayatollahs staunchly expressed their disagreement with the aforementioned Assembly of Experts which sought to reconceptualize Iran’s 1906 Constitution in accordance with the vilayat-e-faqih concept. The Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari was most vocal in his denunciations of Khomeini, openly expressing a preference for a separation of the secular and the religious[113], the  ‘pluralistic social system…where elected officials, not the ulema[114], would wield… power, and where the clergy would interfere in politics only when the state grossly violated the sharia[115]

This bridging of the gap between the clergy and the mainstream Iranians can be seen in the way the ‘Westernized’ youth and women that make up Iran’s middle class rallied around Khatami in ‘the Iranian Spring’ of May 1997, a similar coalition of forces that presaged the Islamic Revolution under the tyranny of the Shah ironically continues under the tyranny of the mullahs.

Incorporating the poorer Iranian youths

As Michiko Kakutani commented in her review of Azadeh Moaveni’s ‘Lipstick Jihad’, the author tended to ‘rely heavily on sources who belong to the educated upper middle class. It is hard for the reader to tell just how representative her impressions might be.’[116] The same problem permeates the analysis throughout this paper- secondary materials tend to focus on the more glamourous and moneyed world of “post-revolutionary, posh health clubs, Iranian fashion shows and Techno-Ashura parties”[117] – a world captivating and alluring in its glossy surreality and in deliciously stark contrast to the realities of Tehran.

The study has attempted to incorporate the works of Asef Bayat in ‘Street Politics’ which examines the passive resistance of the poor against the government in Iran along the same lines pioneered by James Scott. Asef Bayat provides useful and pertinent insights in the psyche of Iranian youths from the marginalized classes. As a result of the rural-urban migratory patterns, Bayat noted how these youths from the marginalized classes had :’witnessed the modern middle-class lifestyle and desired to be a part of it. They longed to pursue the leisure, fashions, and dating games of the rich boys. But these required money, social skills, and a suitable cultural environment- all of which they lacked. Even going to the uptown parks “gives us new complexes… when we rarely have the opportunity to even talk to a girl”.[118]

In another paragraph, Bayat single-handedly provides the answer to the nagging question: Is the passive resistance in Iran, with its literature so heavily focused on the middle and upper-class strata of youths, actually a revolution that is stratified along the lines of social class? Azadeh Moaveni makes this observation of the basijis: “a bearded eighteen year old vigilante from impoverished South Tehran, who despised you for having all the economic and social privileges denied him”[119].Bayat talks about the resentment generated amongst the poorer, marginalized youths due to the discrimination they faced from the richer kids in Tehran: ‘Their shabby and tacky imitation of Westernized youth became a matter of ridicule and denigration, forcing them to rehearse within their own sar-I kouchehs(intersections of alleyways and streets). The North Tehranis used the derogatory terminology of uzgal and dihaati to refer to this group of youths who knew that they were poor but were fascinated by the lifestyles and values of the rich[120]. Frustrated by the impossibility of attaining such life-styles and by the ensuing confusion of identity, they turned against what they could not be or have. Some of these youths therefore, turn to government initiatives like basijis, although there are reports that these basijis, after confiscating banned Western cassettes from cars, usually popped them into their own. One could say that the opportunistic, cynical behaviour of the basijis finds its parallel in the poor peasants of Scott’s Sedaka who feign support for the ruling political party UMNO[121] for the material and political benefits it affords them[122].

The zealousness of basijis should thus be interpreted as the result of having been rejected by the social system, not a genuine belief in the values of the Islamic Republic. Through ways very much similar to their more privileged Northern Iranian cousins then, the poorer youths of Tehran similarly resent the encroachment of the state into their personal space and freedoms and resist in very much the same way, albeit in a shabbier fashion- the same dress codes, the same illicit underground sex, the same jokes made against the mullahs, probably cheaper homemade vodka at parties. In short, even though it may be a shabbier imitation, the form and spirit remains the same.

 Conclusion

In contrast to previous understandings of resistance which places an overt reliance on the ‘open transcripts’ in the form of open revolts- been deemed as a way to understanding the resistance which has previously been kept underground[123], Scott emphasizes the previously neglected elements of passive resistance as key to providing a full transcript of resistance.

Through the insights provided by Scott’s work on the ‘hidden transcripts’ of resistance, this paper then, based on that understanding, proceeds to analyse the ‘hidden transcripts’ in a citizen versus state setting.  In the context of post-Islamic Revolution Iran where two student revolutions against the government have already occurred, the question of agency that Scott brought up does not arise.

 Instead, through our analysis of the forms of passive resistance and the tug-of-war between the Khamenei-led conservative faction and the reformist camp headed by Khatami, this paper concludes that the conservative ruling mullahs are walking a political tightrope in Iran- how to raise the stakes high enough such that youths are not tempted to rebel against the government whilst allowing enough reforms to facilitate that ‘parting of curtains’ to allow the mullahs a glimpse of the forms of resistance. This is to prevent the mullahs from being in a politically precarious position of completely driving resistance underground and the possibility that these forms of resistance will morph into something more dangerous without the mullahs being privy to it.

Contrary to the general assumption that despotic, authoritarian regimes try to quell all forms of resistance or at least hide it well enough such that no one besides the perpetrators are privy to it, this study suggests that the mullahs in Iran actually want to know the kinds of resistance going on whilst keeping it under control.

This paper acknowledges the instrumental role that new forms of media like the internet have played in allowing the outsider (and the mullahs) to be privy to the underground forms of resistance in Iran. Yet, several expressions of resistance- for example the underground parties, the increasingly relaxed dress codes for women in Iran and the temporarily relaxed attitude towards censorship, have been facilitated only through governmental reforms and policies.

Thus, in a despairing mood, this paper suggests that the dissenting mullahs who try to fulfil the role of ‘Gramsci’s organic intellectuals’ might be caught in a situation where they have been unwittingly co-opted into perpetuating the current hegemony.